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What was Multiculturalism?  
 
Vijay Mishra, Murdoch University 
 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought -John Rawls.  
 
Let me begin with an ungainly and selective potted summary of the movement of people 
over the past two hundred years: 
 
1830-1916: half a million from India to the Caribbean, Fiji, Mauritius 
1850-1930: one million Japanese to North America and Brazil 
1890-1920: one million per year from southern and eastern Europe to the USA 
1920s: three million Spanish, Portuguese, Italians to Brazil and Argentina 
1930s: seventy thousand Jews from Nazi Germany to the UK 
1955-1962: sixty-seven thousand people a year move from the Caribbean, Africa 
and India to the UK 
1963-1970: One million each year from southern Europe and Turkey to Germany 
1975: flow of workers from south and east Asia to the Middle East rises from 
100,000 to one million a year 
1989-2000: one million to Israel from the former Soviet Union 
1990s: an average of 150,000 non-UK citizens move to Britain each year 
Late 1990s: about 100,000 migrants move to Australia each year mainly from 
Asia; an average of 350,000 Mexicans to the USA each year; 200,000 Indians and 
Chinese to the USA each year  
Early twentieth century: 250,000 Peruvians migrate to Argentina, Chile and the 
USA. 
 
These figures, although partial and incomplete, emphasize migration (both of refugees 
and those seeking better lives elsewhere) as a dominant feature of modernity. The figures 
also indicate the mix of people on the move and their destinations. Where once these Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
figures were historical facts about migration patterns and necessary for a proper writing 
of a country’s history (the contribution of migrants to nation building for instance), they 
are now looked at in somewhat different terms, terms that place migrants in a different 
kind of history. The latter history is one in which it is not simply facts and figures about 
migration that are discussed, but the definition of the nation-state itself and the migrants’ 
ambiguous sense of attachment to it. In other words, in addition to a type of economic 
history (objective accounts of demographic shifts in a nation) we now theorize, from 
precisely these figures, how the nation-state defines itself in ways that lead to a radical 
rethinking of a nation as a ‘multination,’ one in which the grand narrative of a nation’s 
founding communities (and the presumption of assimilation upon which the grand 
narrative was always based) gives way to a multiply-centred narrative attuned to 
questions of unequal power relations, racism, exploitation and so on. Multiculturalism as 
a theory has arisen out of this shift and presents itself not as an explanatory model of a 
given situation but as a problematic in need of continuous theorization.  
 
It is considered chic for a nation to declare itself multicultural: airports say so 
enthusiastically, politicians declare it interminably, and the media celebrate it. There are 
essentially two kinds of multicultural nations. There are those old nations that have 
always been multicultural but which created the idea of a nation-state as a means of 
transcending difference. Here the nation subsumed cultures as its enlightenment ethos (or 
so it was argued) allowed principles of liberal humanism to create a just society to which 
all could belong and for which all could die. So in them cultures were part of the nation, 
without the nation itself sensing the need to theorize itself in terms of its multiplicity of 
cultures. In these European old nations, ‘multiculturalism’ as theory comes as a challenge 
to an earlier definition of it as empirical fact. The second multicultural nation is one 
where Gerd Baumann’s ‘multicultural riddle’ has special force (1999). These are settler 
nations – almost all of the new world (the USA, Canada and also much of Latin 
America), Australia, New Zealand and, until recently, South Africa. In all these nations 
territorialization presumed the existence of a non-nation, the land as a tabula rasa, so that 
there was no Inuit nation, no Maori nation, no Aboriginal nation, no American Indian 
nation, no Aztec or Mayan nation, and, in the case of apartheid South Africa, no African 
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nation, prior to European colonization. In these settler nations, settler ethos became 
identical with the nation and immigration policies (often a white-only immigration policy 
that, until the late 1960s, was offered as an article of faith, and proudly too) aimed at 
creating a monolingual (or as in the case of South Africa and Canada a bilingual) nation 
under the celebratory sign of (white) assimilation.  
 
In spite of the multiplicity of claims that have been made on behalf of every ethnic 
community to declare itself part of a multicultural mosaic (because it is fashionable to do 
so) the multicultural agenda itself is not of the making of ethnic minorities but of the 
dominant (white) community for whom the management of what the Canadians have 
referred to as ‘visible minorities’ is the principal issue. In many ways the excessive zeal 
with which non-visible minorities have claimed to occupy this space as well, has meant 
that multiculturalism has often lost much of its political and social (as well as critical) 
edge, for if every group within a nation is itself a migrant community (except of course 
the nation’s First Nation people), then every nation is by definition multicultural. This 
argument is quite frankly nonsense because it overlooks a fundamental feature of nations 
and their link to power. A nation’s dominant community (whether as an exclusive group 
such as the bhumiputras of Malaysia or those who have declared themselves to be part of 
the nation’s grand narrative through ease of assimilation) is never part of the multicultural 
mosaic; everyone else is. To repeat: a multicultural nation or a multicultural polity is 
meaningless if each community within a nation-state can equally claim to be part of the 
nation’s multicultural communities. In other words, in any multicultural nation there will 
always be a cultural imbalance between those (one or two communities) whose history is 
foundational to the nation and those who have come, as equal citizens no doubt, but 
whose presence can only have the same legitimacy (in terms of national ideology) 
retrospectively and even then only after their discrepant narratives have been 
incorporated into the ‘foundational narrative’ or when the necessity for the latter has been 
dispensed with altogether. There is then a presumption of recognition of the other over 
time as participants in the historical narrative of the land. Failure to recognize this 
fundamental fact often leads to an idealist or romantic theory of multiculturalism that is 
often way off the mark. A critical multicultural theory should be wary of this.   
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It is important, for my argument, to locate multiculturalism as a problematic essentially 
around the visible, for without that cultural visibility (colour, religion, dress, food) 
multicultural theory may be replaced by a theory of ‘critical assimilation.’ The nexus 
between the ‘visible’ and multiculturalism is readily evident in ‘ethnic’ TV programming 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In a recent essay on television and multiculturalism in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, the authors Shuchi Kothari, Sarina Pearson and Nabeel Zuberi 
(2003) use two programs, Tagata Pasifika and Asia Down Under, as their proof texts to 
read national readings of multiculturalism. The choice of these programs by the authors 
locates the central issues of New Zealand multiculturalism in two domains: the Pacific 
Islands and Asia. In doing so the authors go outside of the country’s de jure biculturalism 
– a biculturalism built on a Pakeha (white) accommodation of the Maori (and vice versa) 
– to work through a more capacious principle that would make the key partners of New 
Zealand biculturalism confront the changing face of the country. In this changing face 
Pacific Islanders – whose homelands survive as remittance cultures – and Asians must 
have a role to play. So the writers suggest that the uncompleted project of biculturalism 
should not mean that multiculturalism cannot be part of the full national agenda until that 
other issue (the Maori-Pakeha question) is resolved. The matter raises interesting 
questions: first, how can the two targeted groups (Asian 5% of the population, Pacific 
Islander 6%) become part of the larger discussions about land rights, and indeed of the 
Waitangi Tribunal and therefore an integral part of debates on New Zealand 
biculturalism? Is this a simple matter of a coalition of Island peoples and Maori, a 
coalition based on ‘common’ origin, for minority rights? Where do we locate the Asian in 
this? Are the interests of the Asians identical with those of the Pacific Islanders? Is it not 
the case that Pacific Islanders are more likely to be sympathetic towards Maori claims 
(the indigenous Fijians certainly given their own problems with a migrant community 
back home) than Asians? What is this category ‘Asian’? Is the Fiji Indian an Asian or a 
Pacific Islander or something yet again?
1 Is it not true that when it comes to 
                                                           
 
Portal Vol. 2, No. 2 July 2005    4 
 
1 After a lecture at the University of Canterbury on 13 October 2003, an Indian PhD student asked me why 
Fiji Indians (or Indo-Fijians) and Indians were so different. ‘Why the antagonism when this is a neutral 
space for them?’ she asked. But is New Zealand a neutral place for Pacific Islanders (including Fiji Indians) 
when there has been such a long history of New Zealand engagement with the Pacific? So many Fiji 
Indians were taught by New Zealand teachers, sat through New Zealand University examinations, studied 
there, worked there that for them the idea of the country as a ‘neutral space’ does not even arise. For them Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
understanding the flows of capital, the acquisition of wealth and an understanding of the 
Protestant work ethic Asians are in fact almost white, though not quite? Failure to address 
these questions leads programmes like the Tagata Pasifika and Asia Down Under 
becoming on the one hand occasions for momentary self-identity (spectators viewing 
selves as actors) and on the other anthropological diversion for the dominant group. It has 
been said that Asia Down Under is attractive to mainstream (white) New Zealanders 
because of its weekly food component.
 2 What the attraction reinforces is food, ‘one of 
the seemingly benign representational systems’ of multicultural difference as the positive 
face of multiculturalism (Gunew 1999, 147).
3  
 
Theories of Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism for whom? Who lays down the ground rules? Who are its beneficiaries? 
In the end do hegemonic systems (like the nation) always neutralize dissent by 
incorporating it within a relatively innocuous system? Here are some questions posed in a 
standard Multicultural Reader. Is multiculturalism antiracist or oblivious to racism? Is 
multiculturalism cultural autonomy or common culture revisited? Is multiculturalism 
grounded in grassroots alliances or diversity management? Does multiculturalism link 
politics and culture or separate them? Who consumes multiculturalism, the salad that it 
is? Is multiculturalism no more than a managerial strategy to get greater productivity 
from the work force? In the well-known debate in the pages of Critical Inquiry between 
Stanley Fish (1997) and Donald Pease (1997), the latter declared: ‘Multiculturalism 
                                                                                                                                                                             
New Zealand is what Fiji has ceased to be, an enlightened democracy where the Indian work ethic has 
value and where, ironically enough, the lost peace of the Pax Brittanica may be reprised. 
2 In an episode of At Home with the Braithwaites (2003), the musical excesses of Bollywood cinema (via 
Andrew Lloyd Webber and A. R. Rahman’s West End musical Bombay Dreams) frames a wedding 
ceremony where, I suspect, chicken tikka masala is served.  
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3 In Sneja Gunew’s argument (1999) something rather more interesting is at work here. Food displaces 
‘word’ (which implies knowledge and dialogue) so that to eat the Other’s food (which also generates a 
series that leads to ingestion followed by abjection) implies that one need not engage with the Other in any 
dialogic sense. Which is why local multicultural food fairs are so popular with the general public; they are a 
safe way of acknowledging multicultural difference without the need to engage with those differences. As 
Gunew points out, early migrants were always registered in dominant consciousnesses in terms of their 
alien (and disgusting) food habits. The undisguised disgust towards the Indian curry in Britain to begin with 
and then its celebration as a quintessentially British dish (Chicken Tikka Masala is as British as Yorkshire 
Pudding) demonstrates the power of cuisine as well as the symbolic incorporation of the alien through food. 
The point is that food signifies a particular history of accommodation and abjection for, as Gunew says, 
‘The insistence on invoking food whenever multiculturalism is represented in a positive way is not quite so 
benign as it may at first appear’ (151).  Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
(whether the boutique-form of appreciation or the strong form of tolerating) does not 
exist. It cannot exist because the laws regulating the norms internal to a specific culture 
necessarily result in incommensurable rationalities’ (398). So how does one argue 
between rationalities that are equally legitimate but incommensurable? Is 
multiculturalism indeed, as Angela Davis observes, a mode of ‘diversity management,’ a 
means of ‘preserving and fortifying power relations based on class, gender, and race?’ 
(1996, 41). For the fact is that multicultural programs are not simply enlightened cultural 
credos, they are means of control that operate across the board from entrepreneurial 
organizations to the prison correctional system, where it is a means of reestablishing 
‘control over inmate populations’ (42). In Angela Davis’ argument one needs to be wary 
of the ‘corporate compartmentalization of multiculturalism’ and address how any cultural 
theory challenges those gender, class and race hierarchies that are at the heart of the 
American nation-state. In the guise of a democratic utopianism, multiculturalism may 
even be complicit in a process that obliterates the corporeality of the Other. In this task a 
critical multicultural theory should always gloss, even as it locates itself as a progressive 
idea, the historical mechanisms of ‘control’ that pre-date multiculturalism.
4  
 
A discourse, as Cynthia Willett observes, which ‘demands a coalition of authors, and is 
especially suited to the genre of anthology’ (1998, 1) cannot offer a definitive answer, nor 
can it close off the argument. Nevertheless it is clear that multiculturalism is very much a 
discourse of the white liberal nation-state to which in the second half of the twentieth 
century many more post-colonial peoples began to arrive. Whereas an earlier 
‘multiracialism’ remained defiantly colonial in its conception of race (natives, slaves and 
coolies were its categories of analysis) and had no capacity for self-critique (and hence 
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4 This consciousness is crucial before we can appreciate Toni Morrison’s observation that on the Pequod 
(in Melville’s great tale Moby Dick) a mainly ‘multicultural … proletariat is at work to produce a 
commodity’ (1996, 27). The necessity of an historical consciousness is particularly true of our age, the age 
of  the informational network society about which Manuel Castells has written so persuasively. According 
to Castells, informational society has created a bipolar world of ‘abstract universal instrumentalism’ and 
‘historically rooted, particularistic identities,’ in other words an opposition designated by the ‘net’ and ‘the 
self’ (3). How the information technology revolution finally plays out questions posed by multiculturalism 
or how indeed we can speak about a multicultural society where identities are governed by the Net and not 
by the Self, are matters that would require research well beyond my ability to do so. I allude to it because of 
the presumption, perhaps unduly optimistic, that the Net will finally bring to an end questions about 
individual and collective identities, about class and gender, issues that underpin multicultural theory. Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
never used the term ‘multiculturalism’), the later form (as ‘multiculturalism’) growing as 
it did from a post-colonial ethos of multiply-centred cultures and histories began to 
challenge the glue that had hitherto bound the liberal nation-state together.
5 But in doing 
so it never altered real power or class relations, never radically altered the definition of 
justice itself and saw the nation-state as a ‘context’ (as Trudeau himself had observed) in 
which other cultures located themselves and not as a space that may be radically 
transformed. It remained a structure of control that kept minorities where they are in the 
guise of a ‘colonialist’ (white) respect of cultural difference without changing the unified 
selves of the ‘managers’ themselves. In the end, multiculturalism remains a thing of the 
past, a way in which the project of the Enlightenment and matters of justice may be 
rethought (but not radically altered) so as to accommodate the ‘alien’ within. And it is for 
this reason – because of its pastness – that it requires constant critique and re-evaluation, 
the need to specify the real, material conditions of racism and their relation to capital at 
every point. Like much else in the liberal agenda, the agenda of multiculturalism too may 
be readily located within unthreatening humanist parameters: individual versus collective 
rights, the presumption of cultural value (we recognize complex communities that have 
offered something to world civilization generally), accommodation of minority rights and 
those of First nation peoples within a dual definition of multiculturalism, the need for 
benign, liberal, non-racist, non-exclusive policies, the limits to tolerance and the legacy 
of the colonial order. To give these a further critical turn and to be able to make a case for 
the ‘pastness’ of multicultural theory we need to critically examine the received 
discourses of multiculturalism. I want to consider these under nine headings: 
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5 Following on from Homi Bhabha’s distinction between multiculturalism as a ‘portmanteau term for 
anything’ and the multicultural as a ‘floating signifier’ (1998), Barnor Hesse thinks through a 
multiculturalism that ‘had become a contested frame of reference for thinking about the quotidian cohesion 
of western civil societies uncertain about their national and ethnic futures’ (2000, 1). Aware of the 
differences between American and British readings of cultural diversity/pluralism, Hesse hones in on the 
differences between multiculturalism and the multicultural (as suggested by Bhabha). For Hesse 
‘multiculturalism refers to particular discourses or social forms which incorporate marked cultural 
differences and diverse ethnicities … [it] can be named, valued, celebrated and repudiated from various 
political perspectives’ (2). Multicultural, a ‘colonial formation,’ is, on the other hand, a ‘signifier of the 
unsettled meanings of cultural differences in relation to multiculturalism as the signified of attempts to fix 
their meaning in national imaginaries’ (2). Simply put, whereas multiculturalism, the signified, is a 
discourse or governmental policy that may be discussed in terms of an increasingly diversified nation-state, 
multicultural, the signifier, refers to those religious, social, linguistic and racial bodies that are grouped 
‘differently’ in everyday social practice. In western nation-states what is really at stake is the nation’s prior 
construction of itself as a unified, homogeneous imagined community. Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
(1)The Politics of Recognition. 
(2) The morally required versus the morally permissible. 
(3) Absolute Tolerance. 
(4) The Politics of Compromise. 
(5) The Inclusive Community. 
(6) The Spectres of Class. 
(7) The Figure of Woman. 
(8) The Post-colonial Condition. 
(9) The Radical Imaginary. 
  
(1) The Politics of Recognition  
At the heart of the politics of multiculturalism is the demand for recognition. No 
theoretician has made the connection as elegantly or as powerfully as Charles Taylor and 
any meditation on the pastness of multiculturalism must begin with Taylor’s influential 
essay first published in 1992, and slightly expanded in 1994. Taylor uses the words 
‘politics’ advisedly to imply the proactive and indeed interventionist nature of the 
multicultural point of view. The demand for recognition, of course, is crucial because of 
the fear of its opposite, of misrecognition or non-recognition, the latter enforcing a 
caricatured, a distorted, a false mirror of an Other in need of adequate, legitimate, 
culturally complex and full representation. To not recognize or to misrecognize demeans 
the Other, condemns her to an image (as it is mirrored in the dominant community) which 
is negatively stereotypical and lacking in all those characteristics (cultural complexity, 
philosophical and aesthetic sophistication) by which the Other has defined its being in 
itself, its own self-consciousness. But the ascendancy of recognition is a recent social 
event, it came with Hegel’s master-slave dialectic which bequeathed a terminology of 
recognition that, later, fused with democratic ideals so as to make recognition a matter of 
individual worth and dignity inherent in democracy itself. ‘Democracy,’ writes Taylor, 
‘has ushered in a politics of equal recognition’ (1994, 27). The modern age, synonymous 
with the democratic age, also ushered in the idea of individual worth, where an individual 
declares his ‘individuality’ and right to be different. Here the older notion of adherence to 
a higher morality (the mark of a person and a characteristic shared by all and hence not 
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individuated) is superseded by a new idea of a model to live by that is within us, the ideal 
of authenticity (31). The insistence on the individual, this monological obsession with the 
self, is ultimately unreal because the essential element of human life is (as Bakhtin 
understood so well) its ‘dialogical character’ (32). The dialogic, then, is crucial for the 
making of one’s identity and it follows that equal recognition when withdrawn or denied, 
can be a form of oppression since it attacks the very heart of the ideal of ‘authenticity.’ 
 
The politics of universalism has now produced, in the public sphere, the idea of equal 
dignity of all citizens (so that there cannot be a second-class citizen) and a modern 
‘notion of identity,’ the latter instrumental in giving rise to a ‘politics of difference’ 
(Taylor 1994, 38). The two, however, are not necessarily assimilable or symmetrical as 
the demand for the latter (identity) in essence wishes to particularize what is, as a 
principle, universal (dignity), a difference-blind view of people. There is then no room 
for qualification (say between an evolved, complex culture and an evolving less complex 
one, the latter proposition itself being contrary to the universal principle of equality and 
hence racist) which leads Taylor to examine further the politics of dignity. The politics of 
equal dignity (via Rousseau and Hegel) bequeathed ‘a regime of reciprocal recognition 
among equals’ (50). The regime functions in a society with a tight unity of purpose (a 
common purpose) that conflicts with a regime of differentiation (50). The legacy then of 
freedom linked to non-differentiation and a common purpose has a homogenizing role 
which is what is contested in the modern world. 
  
The argument is made clearly by Ronald Dworkin who refers to two kinds of moral 
commitment: a commitment to ends of life, the good life, which is a ‘substantive’ 
commitment; and a commitment to deal ‘fairly and equally with each other’ which is a 
‘procedural’ commitment (1996, 56). Since the idea of a good life is a fact of individual 
autonomy (after Kant) it follows that a ‘liberal society must remain neutral on the good 
life’ (57), from which it follows as well that a liberal society cannot espouse publicly 
‘notions of the good’ (58). Taylor, however, looks at the case of Quebec and that 
province’s reading of the Canadian Charter of Rights (1982) and endorses the manner in 
which in Quebec legislation (governing the survival of the French language for instance) 
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makes ‘substantive’ part of the ‘procedural’ commitment of the province whenever 
questions about the ‘integrity of a culture’ becomes decisive. 
 
How then does one address procedural liberalism? Does it homogenize difference even if, 
as in the Quebec example, it patently does not? What are the dangers of the politics of 
equal respect? Can liberalism offer ‘a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can 
meet and co-exist?’ (Taylor 1994, 62). Alluding to the Rushdie affair and mainstream 
Islam’s reading of politics and religion as a unified field, Taylor’s argument is that 
liberalism is not neutral, it is a fighting creed (for its values) but given that societies are 
now becoming multicultural how can one deal with an essentially diasporic sense of 
marginalization on the part of many people ‘without compromising our basic political 
principles’ (63). And given the legacy of colonization, dispossession and racism that 
created ‘deprecating self-images’ of native peoples (Fanon) that the ‘our’ here carries, 
how can one ask people to conform without being accused of relapsing into erstwhile, 
colonialist practices. So liberal democracies are faced with a demand: ‘that we all 
recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but 
acknowledge their worth’ (64).  
 
Taylor formulates this as a presumption: ‘all human cultures that have animated whole 
societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all 
human beings’ (1994, 66). Taylor is careful to emphasize that he has deliberately used the 
word ‘presumption’ because the claim, to him, has to be demonstrated through a ‘fusion 
of horizons’ (after Gadamer) whereby a judgement of another culture would require, 
through research and analysis, a transformation of our own values or standards. To Taylor 
the presumption we owe all cultures may be of this kind, which is different from 
demanding, as a right, this presumption about all cultures. The demand itself is, of course, 
contrary to the ‘difference-blindness’ principle of liberal democracies. Furthermore, 
while we may approach all cultures with the presumption of equal value, it does not 
follow that our judgement itself would be uncritically uniform; that all cultures are of 
equal value. Respect, as distinct from condescension requires critical judgment in which 
there is also implicit a judgment transformed by our understanding of the target culture. If 
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we didn’t all cultures, as being uniformly of equal value, are capable of being 
homogenized and distinctions totally collapsed. The point is made in a footnote (Taylor 
1994, fn 41): ‘In the end, the presumption of worth imagines a universe in which different 
cultures complement each other with quite different kinds of contribution. This picture 
not only is compatible with, but demands judgments of, superiority-in-a-certain-respect.’ 
The overriding choice for Taylor is not between a repressive West and a multicultural 
utopia; rather it is between culture and barbarism, achoice that requires all cultures 
(including one’s own) to undergo comparative analysis. And for us to accept the worth of 
cultures generally the presumption has to be re-stated as: ‘cultures that have provided the 
horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and 
temperaments, over a long period of time – that have, in other words, articulated their 
sense of the good, the holy, the admirable – are almost certain to have something that 
deserves our admiration and our respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have 
to abhor and reject’ (72-73). 
 
Taylor is a liberal Canadian and a prominent philosopher. His argument centres on the 
question of recognition, some transcendental definition of the subject, the value of 
cultures and recognition of the special status of the French in Quebec even if the latter 
may mean the necessity of laws that dictate that except for Anglo-Québécois everyone 
else should go to French schools. Recognition is the key to Taylor’s concept of the 
multicultural – that in a multicultural polity the foundational fathers of the nation (in the 
case of Canada its white settlers) are already part of a larger continuous civilization 
which therefore must have the right to ‘recognize’ those cultures with a similar 
continuity.
6
 
How does one put the ideal of recognition to practical use? In his challenging book, 
Theory in an Uneven World R. Radhakrishnan (2003) suggests that one may have to think 
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6 Both Habermas (1994) and Bhabha (1998), in their commentaries on this essay, see dangers in this 
presumption: for Bhabha a ‘presumption of equality’ gets transformed into a ‘judgement of worth’ (33) 
which denies the contestatory value of minorities in a nation; for Habermas Taylor’s assumption that the 
‘protection of collective identities’ competes with ‘the right to equal individual [subjektive] liberties’ – 
Kant’s original one human right – (1994, 110) overlooks the fact that both ‘private and public autonomy are 
equiprimordial’ with an ‘internal … conceptually necessary connection between them’ (112-113). Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
through a radical alterity in the form of the subaltern, precisely the figure whose self is 
excluded from Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition simply because he, the subaltern, 
has nothing of value to offer. His demands are therefore those of the filibustering 
truculent who has no exchange value since his contribution to anything culturally 
worthwhile is zero. But it is precisely at the point of the subaltern gaze that recognition 
needs to play itself out. In phenomenological parlance the subaltern is the limit situation, 
Kant’s native excluded from the category of the sublime, the Tierra del Fuegan or the 
Aboriginal, from which a politics of mutual recognition may take shape. Taylor had 
indeed shown the importance of the dialogic in this politics. The subaltern subject 
position and that of the dominant subject are morphed into a dialogical situation. And 
again from this new perspective who or what constitutes a legitimate object of knowledge 
becomes problematic.  
 
However we look at it, though, a politics of recognition implies accepting the persistence 
of difference. That the latter exists cannot be ignored or deferred through a politics of 
assimilation. The all-important issue is ‘how to receive and practice difference 
relationally and non-hierarchically’ (Taylor 1994, 65). How can one value difference 
without implying that some differences are to be valued higher than others? Again this is 
suggestively present in Taylor’s essay. If only difference can be located in the in-
between, within a semantics of the hyphen as something that is not located in the 
identitarian binary of self-other but in what Derrida called différance, the always 
differing/deferring condition of subjecthood that does not close off identity, is the 
theoretical challenge to Taylor’s principle of recognition. If the mainstream is itself 
ethnic and has no absolute subject position, if the mainstream declaration of a collective 
self is built around an illusory unity of the Other (which then confirms its own spurious 
unity), then it too needs to interrogate its own identity. Of course, it does not (and should 
not) follow that this recognition of itself would therefore create a level playing field on 
which distributive justice may be ‘liberally’ applied. What is the point of a multicultural 
identity politics when there is universal equality, when ‘distributive justice has been 
achieved?’ (Taylor 1994, 67) This utopian moment is of course unreal, and even if 
realized cannot dissolve difference/différance itself. And at any rate the moment is 
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predicated on the idea of a universal reason that has its own roots in the history of 
liberalism. Multicultural reason, so to speak, would struggle for justice by emphasizing 
the hyphen, by suggesting that selves may remain ‘authentic’ while being recognized.  
 
The horizons of different cultural pasts, these other frames of references, are important to 
bring new multicultural perspectives to acts of consciousness. In this respect 
phenomenology confronts cultural difference and redefines consciousness in terms of its 
placement in different cultures and its investments in them. For the argument is not that 
everything is therefore culture-specific (the ‘one man’s meat is another’s poison’ thesis) 
but that acts of consciousness must be based on comparisons that recognize the Other as 
an object of knowledge, that recognize positions of power and presumption, and are able 
to modify truth conditions accordingly. In other words, the ‘episteme of Eurocentrism’ 
and a historicization of western thought ‘with reference to the rest of the world’ (81) 
become urgent in any attempt at a proper comparative work. What becomes crucial to a 
multicultural poetic are a re-definition of ‘value’ in a multicultural economy, a retreat 
from the centrist/identitarian binary into a politics of relationality and the location of the 
Self and Other within rigorously theorized historical realities. (83) 
 
In these dialogues the divide between civilization and barbarism cannot be mapped on to 
the West and the Rest; the divide inheres within each for both are ‘ubiquitous’ in culture.  
But can recognition – even multicultural recognition – attend to matters of distributive 
justice? Redistribution or Recognition? This is the title of a book in which Nancy Fraser 
and Axel Honneth (2003) debate the relative merits of these two propositions. How best 
can we create a society where opportunities are available to all regardless of race, class or 
creed and at the same time where individual and group differences are recognized? Can 
the two co-exist? Or is each driven by quite specific objectives so that to collapse both 
into one would dilute the force of either. For Nancy Fraser the division of the claims for 
social justice into two – redistributive claims and recognition claims – is a false antithesis 
because as she says ‘justice today requires both redistribution and recognition’ (9). What 
is necessary is a ‘two dimensional conception of justice’ that can accommodate both 
claims in spite of the divergent historical origins of the two: the first, redistribution, is a 
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liberal, post-Marxist position, the second, recognition, is pure Hegelian. To handle this 
adequately, one needs to see that both these claims are less philosophical but more ‘folk.’ 
They are as Nancy Fraser says, ‘folk paradigms of justice’ (11). In a sense the failure to 
merge the two is a result of a critical practice that has seen the two paradigms as 
advancing different agendas. Whereas the redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices 
related to economic marginalization, economic restructuring, and working class 
exploitation and sees these as ‘unjust differentials’ (15), the recognition paradigm focuses 
on matters such as cultural domination, the need to radically transform ‘societal patterns 
of representation,’ the low status of ethnic groups and either attempts at revaluing 
devalued social groups or deconstructing the very terms in which such revaluation and 
celebration occurs. But since neither can nor should subsume the other, it follows that a 
proper theory of justice, as Nancy Fraser proposes, must involve a ‘“perspectival dualist” 
analysis that casts the two categories as co-fundamental and mutually irreducible 
dimensions of justice’ (3). 
 
The respondent to this position, Axel Honneth, does not disagree with Fraser’s primary 
principle – that to understand justice both recognition and distribution should be equally 
addressed and that recognition is not simply a matter of a superstructure governed by 
distribution alone. He parts company with Fraser by linking the two but in a dynamic and 
reciprocal fashion. What Honneth advances is a ‘normative monism’ paradigm of 
recognition. In this paradigm rights (economic, class, labour, and so on) inhere in the 
principle of recognition which has been hitherto defined largely in terms of ‘cultural 
appreciation.’ To recognize entails a post-Hegelian, and fundamentally Marxist 
understanding of cultural value which is a value that is as much about the exchange value 
of the unit of labour as it is the use value of cultural forms. The case is implicit in his 
response which is titled ‘Redistribution as Recognition’ where the argument is one that 
effectively says that unless redistribution occurs, cultural value, however well defined or 
recognized as difference, cannot alter social and economic inequality. And Fraser herself 
recognizes that ‘the just distribution of material resources continues to deserve priority on 
account of its moral urgency’ (112). But Fraser is not a normative monist as she reads the 
two aspects of social justice as parallel aims that must work hand in hand. For Honneth a 
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nation-state that distributes unjustly also misrecognizes or in his own words, ‘even 
distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of social 
disrespect’ (114). 
 
Recognition delineated by Taylor, and refined by Radhakrishnan, Fraser and Honneth, 
anticipate my concluding argument. And the paper perhaps has not much more to offer. 
Nevertheless, even as we locate the ‘great debates’ within the principle of recognition, 
there are additional theories of multiculturalism, some deferring to Taylor, others parting 
company radically, that require critical commentary. To these we must now turn our 
attention. 
 
(2) The Morally Required versus the Morally Permissible: Joseph Carens 
There are of course theories that contest basic liberal principles without sacrificing the 
ethos of liberalism. The Chicana poet Gloria Anzaldúa collapses Texas/California and the 
Chicano homeland Aztlán: ‘This land was Mexican once,/ was Indian always/ and is./ 
And will be again’ (1987, 3). The Canadian political theorist Joseph Carens (2000) 
defends Aboriginal demands for self-government as well as Quebec’s language 
legislation in ways that are contrary to principles of liberal democracy in that procedural 
rights become substantial rights. These special demands, seemingly contrary to the ideal 
of state neutrality on group aspirations, are seen as being contextually neutral and 
compatible with liberalism because, as Carens argues, actual practice may ‘recognize’ 
fundamental principles of democracy (such as freedom of speech, of religion, majority 
rule) differently. This is not to say that a generic culture of democracy is not a pre-
requisite for liberal institutions to flourish; rather the cultural specificity of a democratic 
regime (and let’s face it ‘every liberal democratic regime is culturally specific’) has to be 
nourished and supported, its virtues constantly disseminated. In his book he pursues this 
with reference to the very vexed Fijian example. In brief, referring to Fiji, Carens points 
out that right from the moment when Fijians ceded their islands to Great Britain in 1874, 
colonial policies ensured that traditional Fijian way of life was preserved, so much so that 
even Fijian labour was not allowed on European plantations in the colony. The early 
governors of Fiji took this principle so seriously that they created, at times artificially, 
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communal structures of authority (such as the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, ‘the Great Council 
of Chiefs’) that would reinforce a traditional life-style against current late nineteenth-
century English preference for liberal individualism. To this end the British brought 
indentured labourers from India to work on the Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
controlled (the CSR is an Australian company) sugar-cane plantations. Into a highly-
controlled and structured world was introduced a people who saw individualism as 
escape from both their erstwhile peasant Indian and current Indenture bondage. What 
emerged as a consequence were two radically divergent views of liberal democratic 
principles of two divergent groups: one indigenous, subsistent and collective, the other 
migrant, entrepreneurial and individualistic. Had native Fijians not been cushioned by 
interventionist colonial patronage, the introduction of liberal democratic values on them 
would have been disastrous. Carens, therefore, defends exclusive (and even non-
accountable in legislative terms) policies that were deliberately aimed at preserving Fijian 
culture: ‘the creation of a system of inalienable collective ownership of the land and the 
institutional reinforcement of deference to chiefly authority through various means’ 
(2000, 202). At this point Carens adds: ‘I consider and reject arguments that these 
measures were inauthentic, unfair, and undemocratic’ (202). 
 
The difficulty with Carens’s position arises when he has to work through conflicting 
readings of the nation – one instrumental (of the Indians), the other ‘primal’ (of the 
Fijians) – within the first democratic principle of equal citizenship. No matter how 
careful one is in postulating this first principle as being fundamental to everything else 
that liberal nation-states stand for, it will come under some form of attack (or at least be 
valued discrepantly) if one group has privileges so over-riding that their effect is to create 
a two-tier citizenship. The distinction between the ‘morally required’ (equal citizenship to 
Indo-Fijians) and the ‘morally permissible’ (special rights in favour of Fijian cultural 
preservation) although a good one with which to begin discussing a delicate Fijian 
national problematic, nevertheless may be subject to different orders of interpretation. By 
the latter I mean a shift in reading that would begin to value the ‘permissible’ above the 
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‘required,’ so as to save a race from extinction.
7 Western nation-states have been careful 
not to make laws on ‘moral’ grounds with respect to either their native populations 
(where they exist) or oppressed minorities. But the immense value of Carens’s chapter on 
the Fijian example is that it explores a context that problematizes so many of the 
recurrent themes of multiculturalism that a steadfast adherence to liberal principles (in 
Charles Taylor subtextually [1994] and in John Rawls formally[1971]) does not address.   
 
(3) Absolute Tolerance: Chandran Kukathas 
What is morally permissible may be reconstituted as a principle of absolute tolerance 
above what is morally required. Such is the argument of Chandran Kukathas (1997) who 
takes issue with the subordination of toleration to some other principle (such as equal 
rights) and effectively asks us to think of tolerance itself as a first, abiding and 
overarching principle. To do this one has to immediately de-link rights and freedoms 
from the authority of the state or, put differently, one needs to accept that state 
authorization is not the only legitimating force behind key democratic ideals such as 
justice and freedom. Kukathas examines liberal theories of tolerance and finds them 
wanting. In the case of Rawls (for whom justice is the first virtue of liberal institutions) a 
just society honours liberty and equality provided that the premises on which they are 
based can be established by commonly recognized principles of reason (1971). With 
minor variations here and there, the fundamental fact in liberal theories is that the public 
sphere itself is a ‘reasoning sphere’ (in other words the public sphere constitutes the ‘Law 
of Reason’). This being so, rights and privileges can be incorporated into a polity only if 
they are ‘reasonable.’ When they are not, a consensus has to be found based upon 
‘reasoned’ debate and without violating the liberal principle of individual autonomy. 
How could discrepant minority practices be tolerated if they go against the established 
(and accepted) values of the public sphere? The later Rawls had, of course, admitted that 
minority opinion should be acknowledged through reasoned consensus for the 
establishment of a just society (1996, 1999). Kukathas believes that current liberal theory 
(of Rawls (1996), Kymlicka (2001) and Fitzmaurice (1993), for instance) ‘does not give 
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sufficient toleration to minority communities’ (1997, 79) because the theory assumes that 
there is a common standpoint which is encapsulated in the idea of public reason. This is 
largely because it is linked to acknowledged and settled principles. For Kukathas 
toleration is a principle dependent neither on the state, justice, nor reason; rather it is 
intrinsic to reason: ‘If toleration is forsaken then so is reason’ (83). The obvious question 
that Kukathas directs at himself is: Without a common standpoint, how is any kind of 
moral engagement possible? The solution is adherence to a range of different moralities, 
reasons, experiences, all functioning within a ‘rules of the commons.’ We note the 
following crucial passage from Kukathas’s essay: 
 
Rather than conceive of the public realm as embodying an established standpoint of morality which 
reflects a desirable level of stability and social unity, we should think of the public realm as an area 
of convergence of different moral practices … what has to be recognized about this public realm is 
that it is the product of a convergence which produces a stability and social unity that falls short of 
the permanence or durability many thinkers seek. (84-85) 
 
The social order envisaged here, although lacking values that have been entrenched or 
institutionalized, is characterized by an underlying toleration. Kukathas would rather 
have toleration than stability and social unity along the lines outlined by liberal thinkers 
like Rawls for whom shared values alone give a state its legitimacy.   
 
(3.1) Critique of Absolute Tolerance: Shacher and the Tyranny of Minority Rights 
But absolute tolerance may pose serious problems to minorities within minorities (such as 
‘visible minority’ women) should Kukathas’s principle lead to the creation of absolute 
minority rights. This worry provides the crux to Ayelet Shachar’s Multicultural 
Jurisductions (2001). Writes Shacher: 
 
Multicultural accommodation presents a problem, however, when pro-identity group policies aimed 
at leveling the playing field between minority communities and the wider society unwittingly allow 
systematic maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated group – an impact which in certain 
cases is so severe that it can nullify these individuals’ citizenship rights. (2) 
 
Shachar calls this state of affairs the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability,’ a paradox 
for her because rights (based on Kukathas’s principle/law of absolute tolerance) given to 
minorities may be inimical to the more general liberal values of many of the individuals 
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who ‘inhabit’ minority spaces. The phrase and the recognition of vulnerability is not new 
(many liberals have indeed advanced precisely this argument) but what is new, or rather 
what is inflected differently, are the juridicial implications of individual rights in the 
context of minority rights.  
 
Put blandly: if subject A has certain rights because she belongs to a minority that, 
collectively, has been given these rights, then how could this very subject claim rights in 
addition to those which, when claimed, contradict the rights (strenuously fought for and 
achieved) of the group as a whole. Let us say that a devout Muslim minority group in 
New Zealand is successful in gaining Friday as their Sabbath day and are willing to work 
on Sundays to compensate for it. And this right is legally vested to them so that each 
member of the community now has a Friday Sabbath. Subject A is a devout Muslim too, 
but does not see this as a workable solution as she has children at school with whom she 
wishes to spend her Sundays (Saturdays are taken up by other household work for her). 
Can she opt out without creating a chink in the principle itself? Can she continue to work 
on Fridays and take her Sundays off? Will she be accepted by other Muslims as part of 
their societal culture? The liberal state will, of course, ensure that the freedom to 
dissociate is always there but then again we come face to face with individual rights 
versus collective rights. Are collective rights worth fighting for if individuals within a 
community can readily dissociate once these rights have been given? If many more take 
on this option, are we not making a farce of minority rights based on absolute tolerance, 
enlightened as the idea itself is?  
 
In the end, the argument is one that exposes a significant ideological divide among 
multiculturalists. On the one hand there are those liberals who argue that liberal 
democratic institutions have sufficient flexibility to accommodate, on an ad hoc basis, 
legitimate claims that may come from any group or even from a single individual. On the 
other hand, there are those liberals who believe that an active legislative culture is crucial 
to accommodate the needs of a genuine multicultural polity so that minority groups may 
invoke the power of legislation rather than rely on the whim of juridicial interpretation 
(the courts) to meet their demands. The latter group of liberals are adherents of a 
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differentiated concept of citizenship which is seen as decisively multicultural. 
Jurisdictional autonomy is, however, viewed with unease by most multiculturalists of 
whatever ilk although there are few, if any, examples of such autonomy being granted in 
the modern Western nation-state. For example, it would be unfair if all Muslims in 
Britain were to be governed by Islamic marriage practices, antiquated rituals such as 
female circumcision and hence matters such as divorce, alimony, sexuality and multiple 
wives were a matter to be handled by an autonomous Muslim body in Britain.
8 For 
Shachar ‘a conception of differentiated citizenship which is guided by an ambitiously 
innovative principle’ and ‘one that strives for the reduction of injustice between groups, 
together with the enhancement of justice within them’ (2001, 4) is the answer to the 
general issue of minority rights rather than a prima facie principle of toleration. 
 
(3.2) Critique of Absolute Tolerance: Michael Walzer and Differential Participation 
For Michael Walzer (1997) the trouble with tolerence as an absolute principle is that 
groups have participated differentially and at different historical periods in the negotiated 
settlement of common rules and social practices in any given state. Implicit in this 
reading is of course the prioritization (after Taylor) of the longest continuous inhabitants 
in power or those who were the first to usurp power from native peoples: American 
Puritans, British migrants in Australia and New Zealand, British and French in Canada, 
and so on. Unless one accepts the negotiated settlement of these early settlers on matters 
relating to principles of morality and justice, we would end up with a (postmodern) sense 
of a settlement that was always provisional and immediately open to other regimes of 
thinking. Although the latter is an historical fact as shift in power has produced different 
political and legal systems (the historical expansion of Islam is a case in point) this is not 
a likely scenario in our own age. The point, however, is that there is no historical 
instantiation of a society at work that considers its own negotiated settlement to be 
provisional. In Waltzer’s argument a ‘pluralistic solidarity’ would be far superior to mere 
tolerance because it has the advantage of leading to a rethinking of reason without 
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foregoing a sense of a unified social order and its principles. Here public reason would 
grow out of a dialogue among various communities provided that adequate institutional 
structures and resources are available to all through the state. The recent history of liberal 
democracies has shown a remarkable acceptance of liberal values by people whose own 
cultures have values markedly different from those of the liberal West. The fact that 
democratic institutions continue to flourish in countries like Australia, Canada, the USA 
and the UK, multicultural polities all, through what Robert Putnam said were networks of 
civic engagement that fostered ‘sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage[d] 
the emergence of social trust’ (Gutmann 1998, 6) bear ample testimony to this fact. What 
must be avoided is ‘particularized discourse’ (Laclau’s phrase, 2003) that does not link 
up with the large trans-ethnic or national concerns about endemic class exploitation and 
justice in a multicultural polity.
9 Western democracies are attractive to people not only 
because of the freedom they give to the individual; they are attractive because of the 
many material benefits that accrue to citizens therein. And these rights and privileges 
may be threatened by an uncritical rendition of particularized rights, as a blind extension 
of what Carens referred to as morally permissible exclusionist rights. In theories of 
diversity very often the connection between material benefits and support of liberal 
institutions are overlooked. And tolerance too may not be the self-evident primary 
concern of minorities who, generally, adapt to the norms established by those responsible 
for the original negotiated settlement. So what is all the fuss about multiculturalism?  
 
(4) The Politics of Compromise 
In declared multiculturalists such as Bhikhu Parekh the fuss is about accommodation and 
representation. As part of this agenda we get in Parekh a politics of compromise under 
the sign of a liberal and humane nation-state (a minimum universalism) which can bend 
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9 Ernesto Laclau is concerned here with the US version of multiculturalism that aims at recognizing and 
celebrating difference. The danger is that the celebration then distorts precisely the ongoing struggle for 
recognition and improvement that takes place within ethnic communities. A further danger is that the 
celebration of difference also produces demands by groups for narrow advancement policies that are linked 
to individual groups. Laclau prefers the development of a more comprehensive multicultural discourse, less 
particularized but one that does not destroy particularity per se. He does not deny the significance of 
multiculturalism as a means of creating a more participatory democracy; but he is wary of a 
multiculturalism that could lead to such particularized claims that it fails to address precisely those social 
forces that threaten to destroy access to justice and equal opportunity. See Olson and Worsham (1999, 129-
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its rules on matters such as separate schools or the teaching of vernacular languages, 
representations in key public institutions (the police force, the judiciary), fairer readings 
of the literary canon, incorporation of migrant contributions in the grand narrative of the 
nation, and so on. Thus Bhikhu Parekh’s The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (‘The Parekh 
Report’ 2000a) and Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000b), endorse universalist or liberal 
presumptions, which means that in the end forced marriages, female circumcision, 
rejection of the autonomy of art (within limits), or other practices contrary to majoritarian 
values of decency or morality or aesthetics are not acceptable. What is elided as a 
consequence of the universalist presumption underlying Parekh’s politics of compromise 
– and something that has been noted by only a few commentators – are identity politics 
that work on the basis of, for lack of a better word, postmodern notions of mobility and 
hybridity. There are in Britain and elsewhere a growing number of people (an entire 
generation in fact) whose sense of nationality (being British, French, Canadian, 
Australian or Kiwi) is interpellated through a complex mode of intersubjective 
engagement and definition of the self. For these people the symbolic struggle over Sikhs 
and helmets, women and circumcision, backyard killing of animals for halaal meat, the 
self-evident power of the mullah or priest over congregations in mosque and temple are 
less important than the ways in which they can become fully-fledged, legitimate subjects 
in a nation where being British is seen as a racially exclusive category or right. Here 
fighting mainstream battles about justice and equality at the behest of the underprivileged 
generally transcends the narrow concerns of ethnic groups. Of course, Parekh’s brief is 
different since his presumption is that racism is endemic because racists are not given the 
right kind of information about minorities. In this argument what for Parekh is paramount 
is the need to redress an educational system that makes little concession to other ethnic 
values. In the name of a hegemonic liberalism and individual rights, little is done to 
educate people about non-western values of consensus, reverence of authority and social 
hierarchy. What is worse, no adequate historical explanations of seemingly pernicious 
social practices such as caste, first-cousin marriage and polygamy are given. For Parekh, 
then, only those societies that believe in (and can legislate) a form of minimum 
universalism can offer ‘the most coherent response to moral and cultural diversity’ 
(2000a, 126). For this reason he gives postmodern definitions of subjectivity short shrift. 
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Those who believe in contingent and changing selves lack historical depth, and their 
lives, being ungrounded in culture, are generally shallow and unstable.  
 
Jacob Levy (2000) takes minimum universalism further by stating that the politics of fear 
and exclusion should be avoided. This is not quite the politics of absolute tolerance in 
that cultural practices are not so much absolutely tolerated but subtly modified so as to 
make them acceptable to both the community under fear and the nation’s legislators. He 
refers to the request by Somali immigrants in Seattle for doctors at the Harborview 
Medical Center to perform female genital cutting. The Medical Centre agreed to a lesser 
form of genital circumcision, referred to as ‘sunna circumcision,’ which is a ‘small 
incision on the clitoral hood.’ This met the cultural needs of the immigrants and is less 
harmful than infibulation which is what normally happened to girls as a coming of age 
ritual. A bitter public dispute ensued which led to the passing of a federal statute 
criminalizing genital mutilation. Now it is clear from Levy’s commentary at this point 
that the Harborview Medical Center solution responded to a need, albeit in a manner 
contrary to acceptable public norms, and contained the kinds of public humiliation the 
Somali ethnic community would have had to suffer (and will suffer) if a culturally 
enforced female genital mutilation remained the norm for girls aged six in that 
community. Clearly the principle governing Levy’s thesis is self-evidently realist because 
what is important to him are ways in which real structures are put in place to pre-empt 
racial abuse and vilification. While the thesis leads to a less fluent and certainly a less 
engaging mode of theoretical writing, the argument has the merit of informing theory 
with counter-factual scenarios with which to test many liberal assumptions. Here again 
absolute tolerance is filtered through a realist principle of least pain to either party (a 
nation-state that sees certain acts as barbaric and a relic of its own medieval past; a 
minority group in which members feel incomplete in the absence of the ritual). 
 
(5) The Inclusive Community 
The multicultural state is a political reality. Given this fact, how to work towards an 
inclusive community is the task of liberal theory. Iris Young (2000), for instance, prefer a 
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deliberative rather than an aggregative model of an inclusive democracy.
10 A deliberative 
model would be based on a critical reading of preferences and would not simply endorse, 
as the aggregative model does, ‘the most widely held preferences in the population’ 
(2000). When democratic processes simply reflect an aggregation of preferences, there is 
little room for debate between holders of these preferences; nor is there a consciousness 
about how preferences, collectively, link up to what the state represents as a morally 
legitimate polity. Nancy Fraser had referred to them as affirmative and transformative 
remedies (1998).
11 Still, as with Stephen Macedo (2000) (for whom diversity is to be 
acknowledged but not at the expense of sacrificing fundamental liberal democratic 
values), and David Miller (1999) (for whom social justice is the key to any theorizing of 
the good since the distribution of good and bad things in life among the members of a 
human society holds the key to its principles
12), how do citizens become part of an 
                                                           
10 Young’s argument is that the decision-making process is the democratic ideal and exclusions from it on 
the grounds of cultural intolerance, racism, sexism and so on are proof that a democratic society is not 
living up to its promise (2000, 13-14). In her two models of democracy, the aggregative is a ‘pluralist or 
interest group pluralist’ form of democracy since here decisions reflect the ‘most widely held preferences 
of the population.’ The trouble with this model is that it is not built upon a critical history of its preferences, 
nor are the preferences somehow connected to some larger self-justifying or transcendental principle of 
being, such as justice. When democratic processes simply reflect an aggregation of preferences, there is 
little room for debate between holders of these preferences, nor is there a consciousness about how 
preferences, collectively, link up to what the state represents as a morally legitimate polity. Deliberative 
democracy on the other hand is marked by ‘an open discussion and the exchange of views leading to 
agreed-upon policies’ (22). 
11 In terms of Fraser’s distinctions, multiculturalism has generally been addressed with reference to 
affirmative remedies. In other words, remedies have been suggested within the existing socio-economic and 
juridical frameworks of the liberal nation-state. Against this, transformative remedies (those pursued by 
queer theorists for instance) question the very basis on which sexual norms get established and are therefore 
‘deconstructive.’ Affirmative remedies have been associated historically with the liberal democratic ethos, 
transformative with a socialist ethos: the point, as Marx emphatically declared, ‘is to change it.’ Thus on 
the question of exploitation of people within a nation-state (poorly paid women of colour for instance) 
affirmative remedies do not abolish class difference but effectively ‘support … and shape it’ (Fraser 1998, 
33). The project of mainstream multiculturalism is ‘the cultural analogue of the liberal welfare state’ (35) 
since its aim is not to restructure the relations of recognition (as a deconstructive/transformative policy 
would do) but to superficially re-allocate respect to existing groups and identities. Fraser concludes with the 
observation that the relations of production in any state must change before real redistribution of wealth can 
take place. Conversely, cultural practices must be taken out of their presumed and erstwhile norms before 
group differentiation can be blurred and real recognition given. For the multicultural project, only a nation-
state committed to socialist ideals can deliver both. Nancy Fraser’s socialist critique of current multicultural 
practices is nothing new, but it remains very much a minoritarian point of view in the post-Soviet world. 
 
Portal Vol. 2, No. 2 July 2005    24 
 
12 Miller clearly belongs to the school of thinking that finds principles of social justice that would include 
the whims of almost every conceivable group of people contrary to the overarching values of democracy, 
individuality and social harmony. In short, a theory of social justice (as distributive justice) has to be based 
on what he calls ‘modes of human relationship’ (1999, 25). These modes are: solidaristic community, 
instrumental association and citizenship. Clearly questions about social justice need to address, finally, a 
growing cultural dominant of Western nation-states: the fact that the contemporary polity is becoming Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
inclusive community remains paramount especially when the influential American 
pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty (Giroux 1996, 195-99) constructs multiculturalism 
as a monolithic conspiracy aimed at toppling the consensual basis of American 
democracy even as he agrees, one presumes with Satya Mohanty that ‘human 
personhood’ is a moral notion and individual human worth is non-negotiable as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
progressively multicultural. Not surprisingly even Miller’s book ends with a discussion of globalization and 
multiculturalism. Globalization, of course, poses a rather different and altogether new challenge to social 
justice. If capital now moves to those countries with the highest return and the lowest forms of social 
justice (the establishment of sweat shops from China to Fiji are predicated on this correlation), then it is not 
in the economic interest of a state to emphasize distributive justice (which would include minimum wages, 
superannuation contribution by the employer, and so on) if it means outflow of capital to other nations. 
Multiculturalism poses similar threats to the national ethos. Miller uses the term multiculturalism 
‘specifically to describe the fragmentation of national cultures and the rise of distinct cultural groups – 
whether within or across national borders – whose members’ personal identities are linked to their 
participation in the group’ (252). Miller suggests that multiculturalism has three main consequences for 
social justice. First in the absence of a shared sense of a political community, people may see the 
distribution of justice either far too narrowly (‘what is there for my own ethnic group’ argument, for 
instance) or transnationally (what is there for my global brethren to whom I am inextricably linked through 
religion, for instance). Second, difference may mean that consensus is no longer something that can be the 
basis for distributive justice. Although the later Rawls arrived at the conclusion that divergent groups can 
reach an ‘overlapping consensus on principles of justice,’ (252) Miller is of the opinion that this is really a 
forlorn hope. Third, and notably after Iris Young (2000) and Nancy Fraser (1998), the assumption that 
multiculturalism acts as a corrective to the materialistic base of social justice principles because of its 
emphasis on the politics of cultural recognition is not an issue of distributive justice. Not surprisingly 
Miller decisively rejects the argument 
 
that holds that we should respond to the challenges of globalization and multiculturalism by 
inventing new and more complex forms of justice: if nations are no longer the primary site of 
justice, then let’s have ethnic justice and regional justice and transnational justice all thrown 
together in one glorious casserole! (1999, 252) 
 
 
Portal Vol. 2, No. 2 July 2005    25 
 
A minimal starting point, consistency of application, and equality of citizenship are the requirements for 
justice to operate. In an unusual move, Miller speaks about the need to respond more directly to the 
challenges posed by multiculturalism. Embedded in the phrase is of course an implicit value judgment: that 
multiculturalism poses a threat to theories of justice. The case for it has been vastly overstated, he argues, 
and it needs to be dispassionately examined. In the end Miller does not believe cultural differences (of 
language, religion, cuisine, and so on) ‘inevitably translate into conflicting conceptions of social justice’ 
(261). The tradition from which Miller is writing (the post-Kantian tradition which includes Isaiah Berlin, 
Rawls and Habermas) is one that sees pluralism as ways of knowing, as a mode of being where all its 
various (and multifaceted) components are driven by the Enlightenment project of daring to know and 
where an ethos of commonality, a language of shared values, may be either taken for granted or has to be 
socially invented. On the matter of social justice at any rate, an enlightened liberal democracy can ensure 
that it is equally and fairly distributed. The threat to democracy comes when group identities overtake 
national identities: ‘The real challenge of multiculturalism, then, is not that it makes agreement about 
principles of social justice impossible to achieve, but that it makes it harder for people to see themselves as 
members of an inclusive community across which these principles are to be implemented’ (263). The 
trouble with this conclusion is that Miller continues to read ‘inclusive community’ as an abstract polity and 
not as fully-fledged citizens with degrees of social distinctions at the level of felt-life. As someone like 
Parekh would retort: to whose definition of the inclusive community should we subscribe, high Tory or 
those of the Royle family in the popular TV show? Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
category of social analysis (1997).
13 As with many liberal thinkers the fear is that 
multiculturalism may introduce a variable concept to the absolute, not negotiable, 
morality of human worth. 
 
(6) The Spectres of Class 
The outstanding absence in multicultural theory is a theory of class largely because 
multicultural theory has been primarily concerned with identity politics, minority rights 
and how the liberal nation-state accommodates these. Class, of course, does not belong to 
the same category as gender, race or ethnicity. It is not, in Edna Bonacich’s words, ‘an 
identity, but a system of economic power and domination. Class relations are not 
relations of identity, but relations of dominance and resistance’ (1999, 298). What then is 
the nature of capitalist intervention in multiculturalism? Is it, as Žižek (1997) and García 
Canclini (2001) have suggested, the new logic/ideology of global capitalism and really a 
policy of containment necessary because of the need for labour in western democracies?
14 
                                                           
13 Richard Rorty wrote in the New York Times that left-wing supporters of multiculturalism were in fact 
‘unpatriotic’ as their position rocked the very foundations upon which national identity and national pride 
were based. The trouble with Rorty’s position, as Giroux demonstrates, is not that it ‘equates cultural 
differences with a threat to national unity’ (1996, 197) but that it constructs multiculturalism as a 
monolithic conspiracy aimed at toppling the consensual basis of American democracy. What Rorty 
overlooks is that national unity is itself a ‘shifting, unsettled complex of historical struggles and 
experiences’ (198). Mohanty argues that multiculturalism is a ‘form of epistemic cooperation across 
cultures.’ He makes a case for a realist version of multiculturalism (where the presumption of the value of 
human worth is a not-negotiable transcendental principle) against what are the dominant ‘relativist or 
liberal versions’ (1997, 198). 
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14 For García Canclini, however, Latin American societies have a distinctly hybrid norm in the figure of the 
mestizo or mixed race person. García Canclini suggests that Anglo-Americans and Latin Americans have 
different experiences of globalization because they define the multicultural nature of their nations rather 
differently: ‘What in Latin America has been called cultural pluralism or heterogeneity is conceived as part 
of the nation, whereas in the U.S. debate, as various authors explain, “multiculturalism means separatism” 
(Hughes, Taylor, Waltzer)’ (2001, 10). In Latin America societies are ‘not structured by a multiplicity of 
ethnocommunitarian groupings’ but by practices that go back to ‘models of secular republicanism and 
Jacobin individualism’ (11). Of course, arguments in favour of ‘a single absolutist patrimony’ for the state 
(as its dominant cultural ethos) and movements ‘affirming exclusivistic self-affirmations’ have indeed been 
a feature of Latin American life. But the dominant tendency in Latin America has been towards an 
affirmation of national identities as being hybrid and located across cultures in an ‘asymmetrically 
interdependent’ fashion. It may well be that inherent in Charles Taylor’s multiculturalism of recognition is 
a principle of anticipatory hybridity as recognition of value in the Other may also mean creating identities 
that would grow out of all these ‘recognized’ values. For García Canclini what happened in Latin American 
societies may become a feature of all societies not through an historical imperative (as in the case of Latin 
America) but through the impact of modes of consumption upon ‘forms of citizenship’: we are what we 
consume. The logic of the market may well shape (post)modern identities, making them ‘transterritorial and 
multilinguistic’ (29), which, of course implies, that multicultural jurisdictions themselves may well have to 
be alert to changes that transcend the solidarity principles governing any given nomos. Often the case for 
minority rights for a group reprises the older definition of identity as belonging to a nation – the same Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
And in the name of racial and gender diversity do capitalist institutions like universities 
appoint people other than those who belong to the middle class anyway? To stretch 
Bonacich’s point (1999), the argument really is that multiculturalism is an ideology (a 
distorted system of beliefs, dare one say even a false consciousness?) that hides the fact 
that capitalism generates economic and political inequality. Thus it could be said with 
Elizabeth Povinelli (1998) that the Mabo decision in Australia (that finally put to rest pre-
colonial Australia as a terra nulius) is a control mechanism which keeps the values of the 
monoculture intact so that claims under Mabo, or even under the Waitangi Tribunal (in 
New Zealand) must take place under capitalist regimes of thinking.
15
                                                                                                                                                                             
language, customs, family practices, religion and so on. The shift from a monadic definition of identity (the 
latter remains an important factor when we address minority rights) to a global multicultural identity (based 
on consumption) is a matter that has not been subjected to thorough critique. If we were to shift our 
attention from Western nation-states with large diasporic communities to Latin American nation-states 
where multitemporal, multiethnic and multicultural heterogeneity is the norm, we may become less anxious 
about the on-going necessity of state intervention for the creation of a multicultural polity. Of course, in 
García Canclini’s postmodern scenario of consumption based citizenship, there is a postcolonial idealism 
(the inevitability of hybrid identities) that may not be able to address the here-and-now relations of unequal 
power and representation.  
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15 Liberal investment in multiculturalism takes Povinelli to advance what her essay seeks to understand: 
‘how the state uses a multicultural imaginary to solve the problems that capital, (post)-colonialism, and 
human diasporas pose to national identity in the late twentieth century’ (1998, 579). Povinelli makes an 
archival reading of the 1992 Australian High Court ruling on the native title rights of indigenous 
Australians (the Mabo ruling). The Mabo decision has been the single most important symbolic moment in 
Australian-indigenous race relations since the founding of the (white) Australian nation. The decision was 
celebrated by the liberal left and grudgingly accepted by the center-right more or less on the same grounds: 
the decision was accepted only because Australia had recently reconstituted itself (albeit without a 
Multicultural Act) as a ‘multicultural nation.’ Yet in this declaration what really happens is that 
monoculture accepts difference and diversity (under a multicultural template) because the dominant 
monoculture (as the French/English biculture in Canada) sees this as the proper thing to do by its own 
Enlightenment rules. In other words, even as multiculturalism is embraced (and land rights to a point 
endorsed) the transcendental sign of the nation as defined by its enlightened monocultural values remains 
paramount. This is normative theorizing in a sense, but very powerful because Povinelli is not simply 
acting out a form of multicultural activism. For Povinelli the (post)narrative of Mabo shows the ways in 
which multiculturalism becomes the grounds for ‘a new form of national monoculturalism’ (580). In this 
new gloss over the old order, the state inflects the registers in which it had hitherto represented itself. 
Where there was, in the case of Aboriginal land rights, the doctrine of terra nullius (Australia as a tabula 
rasa upon which territorial rights could be unproblematically superimposed), there are now rights based on 
common law (from which native peoples had been excluded). Where there was expansionism and the 
frontier mentality, there is now the language of shame, dispossession, guilt and trauma. Place the two 
together and the native Other enters the symbolic order of (white) human sciences. Seen in this light the 
nation-state’s juridical and social conscience defuse and divert liberation movements and anti-colonial 
struggles that native peoples in European settler nations (Aborigines, Maoris, North American Indians) had 
never participated in. This is as true of the New Zealand Maoris as it is of native Fijians whose own version 
of land rights must be connected to the absence of a narrative of anti-colonial struggle in their lives. In the 
case of Fiji, the discourse of anti-colonialism was primarily an Indo-Fijian struggle for independence 
(modeled on the experience of the Indian motherland). In this struggle the native Fijian lumpen proletariat 
played no part. And for George Speight and his nationalist followers both the British and the Indo-Fijians Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
The cynical reading of multiculturalism is that multiculturalism, as a state ideology, 
deflects possibilities of a class struggle against a system of economic domination and 
distorted distribution through an excessive emphasis on ethnic difference. In a timely 
reminder Bonacich states: ‘Somewhere along the line, our concerns over gender and race 
have led us to lose sight of property relations, or to treat them as an old issue whose time 
has passed. Marxist ideas are denounced as male and Eurocentric’ (1999, 303). 
  
Like Bonacich, Richard P. Appelbaum also declares that ethnicity and gender surface as 
important elements in global capitalism because ‘global capitalism has meant the 
feminization of labor worldwide, and the ethnicizing of labor on the home front’ (1999, 
338). It becomes important that the discourse of multicuturalism is read in materialist 
terms to explore the extent to which ‘a highly volatile multiculturalism’ is now predicated 
on exploitation and class ‘differences based on race and ethnicity.’ In Capital Volume 1 
(1967) Marx distinguished between constant capital (investment in machinery whose 
value is fixed and must be paid off), variable capital (costs as indicated by the wage bill) 
and surplus value (the unpaid labor extracted by the capitalist which is the source of the 
capitalist’s profit). Since capitalism survives on surplus value, it needs to ensure 
maximum disparity between variable capital and surplus value. In a period of ever-
increasing global capitalism, multiculturalism becomes a coded word for the feminization 
and ethnicization of cheap labour, and hence a source of surplus value: ‘From cars to 
clothing to electronics, the hands that produce our goods and services reveal the 
exploitative side of multiculturalism: they are hands of color, of women, of impoverished 
Third World peoples driven by hardship and hunger to labor in the global factory’ 
(Appelbaum 1999, 340). To make this point, Appelbaum points out that in Los Angeles 
county alone there are around 125,000 garment workers, many of whom are illegal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were equally vulagis (‘foreigners’). So a monoculture uses multiculturalism to institutionalise (and 
neutralise) difference. ‘In this liberal imagination,’ writes Povinelli:  
 
the state apparatuses, as well as its law, principles of governance, and national attitude, need merely 
be adjusted to accommodate others; they do not need to experience the fundamental alterity of, in 
this case, indigenous discourses, desires, and practices or their potentially radical challenge to the 
nation and its core institutions and values such as ‘democracy’ and the common law. (1998, 581) 
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The subaltern then gets incorporated into a liberal world order of enlightened values even as difference, 
under the template of multiculturalism, continues to be celebrated. Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
immigrants and people of colour. The factory owners are not necessarily white, and 
racialized exploitation is not necessarily a replay of the old white master/ person-of-
colour slave opposition. No racial group or nation – Koreans and Chinese in Los Angeles 
or China and Japan – escapes the exploitative logic of racism.
16 Since capitalism thrives 
on class distinctions, racism becomes simply a means of rationalizing class.  
  
(7) The Figure of Woman 
Theories of class take us directly to the figure of absolute exploitation already alluded to: 
the figure of the marginalized, subaltern woman of colour under the patronage of 
multiculturalism. In a powerful essay Nira Yuval-Davis (1999) has examined the largely 
under-theorized area of gender relations and multiculturalism. The role of women of 
colour, especially among minority groups, she argues, is fundamental to any study of 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism does not therefore address power relations within 
ethnic contexts or, at a broader level, discriminatory practices or even policies that affect 
the lives of many people, and especially women of colour. It follows that a major 
criticism of multicultural policies is the absence in them of any real theorizing of class 
positions and ‘internal power conflicts and interest differences within the minority 
collectivity’ (Yuval-Davis 1999, 118). When all individuals from a minority community 
can be rendered authentic, they become equal recipients of benefits that would otherwise 
go to only those who are most in need of them. In many ways a celebration of cultural 
pluralism where ‘hybrids’ challenge (and even erase) the ‘totalizing boundaries’ of 
nation-states is marked by an absence of any real engagement with class differences for 
which as Yuval-Davis suggests a ‘transversal politics’ is essential. Transversal politics is 
based on dialogue that takes into account the different positionings of women, or people 
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16 Of course, as Étienne Balibar’s often reprinted essay ‘Class Racism’ (1999, 322-333) shows, one should 
not rush headlong into any simple relationship of ‘“expression” (or, equally, of substitution) between 
racism and class struggle’ (323). The problematic (into which theories of multiculturalism too locate 
themselves) may be reformulated as follows: nationalism neutralises class conflict by positing a higher 
mystical unity based on common destiny but transforms the intrinsic narrative of class struggle into a 
xenophobic exclusion of the Other. In other words, nationalism is intrinsically racist but denotes that the 
social relation it transcends has a built-in tendency towards racism. This social relation was obviously the 
class racism upon which ‘Aristocratic racism’ and its avatar ‘colonial racism’ (the imperialist always 
defined himself in aristocratic terms regardless of his own real class origins) were based. Although Balibar 
does not address multiculturalism as such, it is clear that the kinds of reciprocal determinations he discusses 
between nationalism and racism, and between class racism and ethnic racism, have invaded discussions 
about multiculturalism. Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
in general, but does not grant any of them a priori privileged access to ‘truth.’ In 
‘transversal politics,’ perceived unity and homogeneity are replaced by dialogues that 
give recognition to the specific positionings of those who participate in them, as well as 
the ‘unfinished knowledge’ that each such situated positioning can offer (121).  
 
In a rather different discourse Susan Okin (1999) also raised these issues with reference 
to patriarchal endorsement of personal laws affecting women from various cultures: 
clitoridectomy, forced or child marriage, patriarchal laws governing rape, sexual 
servitude, purdah and so on (all of which contravene the case for a woman’s dignity as 
being equal to that of a man’s). To Okin, claims by minorities that these practices should 
continue reflect age-old power structures that get transplanted in their new, primarily 
Western, homes. Their defense by the multicultural body politic (the new enlightened 
nation-state) cannot be justified as these rights do not adequately represent the rights of 
the weak within ethnic cultures. For the feminist, multiculturalism and feminism (which 
challenges all cultural traditions) are mutually exclusive unless multicultural communities 
undergo the kinds of reform on matters of women’s rights that has been a feature of the 
West for at least a century. There are no group rights that can presuppose unequal gender 
roles. So for Okin unless a culture is willing to alter itself (and adopt liberal democratic 
views on women) or failing that become extinct, there can be no moral support for a 
multicultural policy that defends personal religious laws and practices that are patently 
anti-feminist. For Yuval-Davis the solution lies not so much in a collective 
transformation (which can only be an ideal although historically inevitable) but dialogic 
intervention and self-critique.
17
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17 Gayatri Gopinath in her essay ‘Nostalgia, Desire, Diaspora’ (2003) makes an important statement about 
the patriarchal, heterosexual politics of the immigrant Indian communities in the United States. Since these 
communities position women as ‘repositories of an essential “Indianness”… any form of transgression on 
the part of women may result in their literal and symbolic exclusion from the multiple “homes” that they as 
immigrant women inhabit’ (264-265). The ‘non-heterosexual Indian woman’ is therefore unimaginable in 
the ‘dominant diasporic and nationalist logics’ (265) of the community. Gopinath refers to the case of the 
Federation of Indian Associations (FIA) sponsored annual India Day Parade in New York. In 1995 the FIA 
refused members of the South Asian Lesbian and Gay Association (SALGA) to march in the parade. FIA’s 
position on ‘Indian queers’ and ‘Indian lesbians’ is not uncommon among multicultural communities 
generally; Gopinath’s essay with reference to the Indian diaspora draws our attention to the gender politics 
of multicultural communities generally and the general ‘unrepresentability of a non-heteronormative 
(female) subject’ in what continues to be a heavily patriarchal and heterosexual understanding of minority 
rights by minorities themselves. Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
(8) The Post-colonial Condition 
Britain, a key player in the formation of the modern idea of empire, has been used as the 
‘cite’ to think through recognition and its denial as a legacy of colonialism itself. Barnor 
Hesse, using the conceptual neologism ‘transruption’
18 in the Introduction to his edited 
volume Un/settled Multiculturalisms (2000, 5) asks, ‘Why is it that in Britain there has 
been no serious debate about multiculturalism as part of the mainstream political 
agenda?’
19 In other words, as a ‘spectre’ and as the threatening return of the repressed 
within, multiculturalism is silenced, debates about it seen as a way of ‘splintering’ the 
nation. Hesse then goes on to trace the ‘reasons why the politics of multiculturalism 
[became] a non-debate in Britain by the middle of the 1990s’ (5). 
 
In Britain, of course, multiculturalism is directly linked to the question of post-1945 ‘non-
white’ immigration and to the various right wing (expulsionist) and liberal (from 
assimilationist to cultural ‘celebrationist’) responses to the question of national 
integration. Having recognized, with Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, that ‘ethnic 
and racial divisions get reproduced from generation to generation (1992, 158), the liberal 
response was to actively valorize the aesthetic domain of cultural difference without 
addressing the questions of power relations. This very same valorization was then read as 
a threat to things essentially British by the Right. In the end, as Hesse points out, the 
fundamental issue of racism in Britain was sidelined. The difficulty with multiculturalism 
in Britain was with its generalized conception, as if in its generality (equal value of all 
cultures without, in Charles Taylor’s terms, a theory of recognition) it could offer full 
explanations about discrepant, indeed contradictory, social representations and national 
                                                           
18 ‘Transruption,’ says Hesse ‘comprises any series of contestatory cultural and theoretical interventions 
which, in their impact as cultural differences, unsettle social norms and threaten to dismantle hegemonic 
concepts and practices.’ They ‘disarticulate the logic of discourses that seek to repress, trivialize or silence 
difference’ (17).  
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19 For Hesse ‘multiculturalism refers to particular discourses or social forms which incorporate marked 
cultural differences and diverse ethnicities … [it] can be named, valued, celebrated and repudiated from 
various political perspectives’ (2000, 2). Multicultural, a ‘colonial formation,’ is, on the other hand, a 
‘signifier of the unsettled meanings of cultural differences in relation to multiculturalism as the signified of 
attempts to fix their meaning in national imaginaries.’ Simply put, whereas multiculturalism, the signified, 
is a discourse or governmental policy that may be discussed in terms of an increasingly diversified nation-
state, multicultural, the signifier, refers to those religious, social, linguistic and racial bodies that are 
grouped ‘differently’ in everyday social practice. In Western nation-states what is really at stake is the 
nation’s prior construction of itself as a unified, homogeneous imagined community.  Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
identity to all and sundry. What is now urgent, and this is Hesse’s primary point, is the 
necessity to contest British multiculturalism (in its however residual form) ‘as 
symptomatic of an unresolved post-colonial condition following decolonization, the 
dismantling of the British Empire and post-war migration from the erstwhile colonies’ 
(11). It is then the particular – diasporic formations in Britain, the nation’s imperialist 
legacy – that requires factoring in a theory of multiculturalism. The latter must address 
the legacy of colonialism at the heart of the British nation and difficulties the British have 
had in coming to terms with its ‘post-colonial’ condition. In Britain especially the need 
for a ‘particularized’ post-colonial British multiculturalism sensitive to the nation’s 
historical formation is therefore essential. For what has happened is that the particular has 
been subsumed by the idea of a ‘tolerant British nation which is intrinsically uninformed 
by historically racist processes’ (12). In Britain, then, multicultural theory (and practice) 
must address the nation’s colonial history and its ‘incomplete process of colonization’ so 
as to readdress the impact of Black and Asian migration on ‘the racially exclusive 
narcissism of the nation’ (15). Multiculturalism needs to be aware of discrepant ways in 
which diaspora thought affects the nation, the ways in which ‘unresolved discrepancies’ 
need to be acknowledged as being crucial to an understanding of the modern nation. 
What the dominant discourse must acknowledge is the continuing validity of these 
alternative points of view, alternative life worlds that cannot be repressed. Hesse calls 
these discrepancies, these eruptions, multicultural ‘transruption,’ which signifies the 
constant and ‘recurrent exposure’ of the discrepant in the nation-state. 
  
In the concluding essay to Hesse’s volume Stuart Hall too argues that the new multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural nation-states grew out of the ‘dismantling of the old empires’ 
and ‘reflect their prior conditions of existence under colonialism’ (2000, 212). An 
understanding of the connection between the two is necessary before one can explain, 
especially in the context of Britain, the neo-imperial character of race relations in 
multicultural Britain. At the same time we need to be conscious of three broad shifts: the 
end of the old European imperial system, the end of the Cold War and the spectre of 
globalization. At one level these three forces may well suggest a new world order no 
longer marked by ethnic or class difference, or an agonistic politics since the triumph of 
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individualism and capitalism introduces an order marked by wealth and not ethnic, 
religious and cultural difference. Reality in fact tells a rather different story. For instance, 
even as globalization signals the idea of the universal subject, it produces the figure of the 
subaltern who stresses his or her difference. Indeed the ‘classic Enlightenment binary 
between Traditionalism and Modernity is displaced by a disseminated set of “vernacular 
modernities”’ (Hall 2000, 215). In other words, the symbols of modernity are acquired 
but on their own terms so that global and local interests remain in tension. Hall reads this 
tendency as an instance of what Derrida referred to as ‘différance’ and suggests (after 
Homi Bhabha) that différance is played out best in the ‘borderline time’ of minorities. 
What is produced is a localism which is not simply a residue of the past (such as a return 
to absolute religious beliefs) but ‘something new – globalization’s accompanying 
shadow; what is left aside in globalization’s panoramic sweep, but returns to trouble and 
disturb globalization’s cultural settlements’ (Hall 2000, 216). The form this localism 
takes (progressive, creative, fundamentalist, integrative) depends upon the politics of the 
host nation in which minorities are located. 
 
As the concluding essay in Hesse’s edited volume, Hall’s essay looks at the particular 
case of Britain in terms of Hesse’s idea of the ‘transruptive force.’ The British have seen 
themselves as a unified culture suddenly threatened with the arrival of Blacks and Asians 
in their midst. The ‘multicultural question’ is therefore seen as something that came with 
the arrival of the SS Empire Windrush in 1948, bringing the first Caribbean migrants, a 
history so powerfully shown in Andrea Levy’s remarkable novel Small Island (2004). 
Hall’s point is that the multicultural question has been part of Britain’s domestic and 
colonial histories and that British attitudes towards coloured immigration simply 
replicated the older colonial attitude of subordination and exclusion. It is this attitude that 
has blinded the nation from addressing the new ‘racialized, ethno-cultural and religious 
identities’ in the country. Given the nation’s prior belief in its own unified culture (a 
culture into which admission for the colonized outsider was a non-issue) the British (like 
their settler nation counterparts elsewhere in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
States and for a long while South Africa) simply worked on the presumption of final 
assimilation of subaltern difference. What happened in fact was that these coloured 
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diasporic communities offered a ‘novel cultural configuration’ (as ‘cosmopolitan 
communities’) contrary to the logic of full assimilation. They were also seen both as a 
relic of a communal sense that ‘liberal society is supposed to have lost’ and as ‘the most 
advanced signifiers of the urban postmodern metropolitan experience’ (Hall 2000, 221).  
 
The first ‘transuptive impact’ of these diasporas was on the received definitions of ‘race’ 
and ethnicity. As with the idea of a unified British culture so too with race as the British 
saw themselves as a unified body (to which the term race cannot be applied) against 
which ethnic difference may be measured. Indirectly then race has reared its head albeit 
‘under erasure.’ Hall argues that of the two major non-white communities in Britain the 
term ‘race’ is applied to Afro-Caribbeans and ‘ethnicity’ to Asians. Although ‘race’ is not 
a scientific but a social category, its implied application primarily to Blacks incorporates 
in its very definition racist characteristics (skin colour, shape of the nose, and so on) that 
transform a social definition into a genetic or ‘natural’ one. And although ‘ethnicity’ (not 
‘race’) is applied to Asians because the latter’s cultures and religions are most on display, 
even here the biological referent that characterizes race is never totally absent. If the 
category of ‘race’ had defined Blacks as being indolent and congenitally indisposed 
towards the work ethic, the category of ‘ethnicity’ brought genetic characteristics 
(feminization of the body, incapable of playing sport) to the Asians as well. The 
multicultural question then becomes twofold: on the one hand it must address questions 
of racism (because the reading of both Black and Asian is ultimately racist) and at the 
same time engage with racial difference because even after two generations these 
multicultural communities have not become part of an unproblematic Britishness.  
 
This leads naturally to the ‘transruptive’ effect multicultural communities have had on 
definitions of culture. Post-Enlightenment modernity has offered the opposition of 
‘Particularism versus Universalism, or Tradition versus Modernity’ as the framework 
within which to examine culture. To combine categories that are in opposition is seen as a 
relic of the Middle Ages and a logical impossibility in the modern world. So modernity 
cannot understand the idea of a traditional Islamic modernity or diasporas espousing anti-
modern sentiments (such as the burning of a book, female genital mutilation or the fatwa) 
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while at the same time claiming to be modern. Here Hall, once again borrowing from 
Bhabha, puts forward the ‘transruptive’ category of ‘hybridity’ as the cultural logic of 
translation, the mark of the place of the incommensurable in diaspora when seen from the 
post-Enlightenment tradition/modern divide. Writes Hall, ‘In diasporic conditions people 
are often obliged to adopt shifting, multiple or hyphenated positions of identification’ 
(2000, 227). A hyphenated declaration of citizenship is often the norm as Black and 
British or British-Asian descriptions are not uncommon. What these imply is the presence 
of the principle of heterogeneity and hybridity in the life of diaspora. ‘They are all,’ 
writes Hall, ‘negotiating culturally somewhere along the spectrum of différance, in which 
disjunctures of time, generation, spatialization and dissemination refuse to be neatly 
aligned’ (227). 
 
A third ‘transruptive effect’ of the new multiculturalism is the challenge the latter poses 
to what looked like a settled terrain of differences between the liberals and the 
communitarians. What is at issue primarily is the self-evident universalism of post-
Enlightenment liberalism. In other words, the latter tradition looks less and less like a 
universal principle of reason and proper governance and more and more like a 
particularity (a European historical particularism) that masquerades as a universalism 
since it is grounded ‘in the customs, habits and rituals of everyday life’ (Hall 2000, 229). 
Its tenets of universal citizenship and cultural neutrality no longer hold good in 
multicultural polities; multicultural difference is now making headway into the domain of 
the rational and the universal as personal and communal codes transform the neutrality of 
law and introduce exceptions as not unqualified precedent. Recall the right of Sikhs to 
wear turbans and the acceptance of ‘consensual arranged marriages’ (Hall 2000, 231). 
 
These transruptive effects lead Hall to pose the question: ‘What are the premises behind a 
radically distinctive form of British multiculturalism?’ (231). The nation will have to 
reflect on its racism and the ways in which biological racism continues to shadow 
questions of cultural or ethnic difference; the nation will have to critically rethink its own 
majoritarian logic and reconfigure itself in a ‘radical post-national form’ (232); it needs to 
understand that migrant communities ‘bear the imprint of diaspora’ (232) since they are 
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vertically integrated into their own communities even as they laterally link with other 
communities. A greater cultural diversity at the heart of modernity without relapsing into 
ethnic absolutism or closure should be the aim as one rethinks, after Laclau, ‘one’s 
relation to [the] past as a critical reception’ (233). 
 
If indeed ‘western particularism’ came to be rewritten as ‘global universalism’ as hall 
says (234), can we not see how difference, the particular, can be located in the heart of 
the universal? Is it a matter of reaffirming democracy or of accepting, as Hall argues, that 
democracy is always a struggle for justice, for the right balance between competing, and 
equally defensible, positions? One has to, in short, ‘effect a radical reconfiguration of the 
particular and the universal, of liberty and equality with difference’ (236). A deepening of 
the democratic ethos must work hand in hand with an ‘unrelenting contestation of every 
form of racialized and ethnicized exclusionary closure (whether practiced by others on 
minority communities, or within communities)’ (236). A more inclusive Britishness 
should be the ultimate goal.  
 
(9) The Radical Imaginary  
Stuart Hall is aware that this new political logic is a lot harder to put into practice than to 
theorize and it is the former (the practice) that has invariably led to arguments that are in 
the end circuitous, offering the right critique but unable to transform national 
consciousness. The need for a transformation is at the heart of Richard J. F. Day’s 
capacious Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity (2000). The book has 
an historical sweep – the extent to which Canadian multiculturalism continues the 
discourse on diversity begun with Herodotus – and theoretical investigation – is ‘the 
current state policy of multiculturalism … a stage on the way to a ‘post-industrial 
Sittlichkeit?’ (3). On both these premises, Day’s conclusions verge on the cautious. He 
sees Canadian multiculturalism not as a solution to the age-old problem of diversity but 
as an extension and re-thinking of that problem. In other words, Herodotus’s diversity 
scheme, the problematic that it is, continues to fester. And as for the new post-industrial 
ethical order implied in Canadian multicultural policy as suggested by Charles Taylor, the 
goal remains elusive as the policy has become a way of managing diverse identities and 
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not the establishment of a new order that transcends the relations of power (master and 
slave) ‘found in the “deficient” Hegelian forms of recognition’ (3). Lest this position is 
seen as endorsing the Conservative criticism of multiculturalism as the royal road to the 
destruction of a fragile Canadian unity, Day argues that he is not against the policy as 
such. What he critiques is the claim that the policy should create a state of total 
recognition of difference and reconciliation of disparate claims. The history of diversity 
has had this underlying ideological thrust – to create a unity out of diversity, initially a 
Franco-British diversity, and now a multi-ethnic diversity. Day argues that the Canadian 
citizen must go beyond the ‘fantasy of unity,’ that unity is the final goal of 
multiculturalism or indeed of the nation itself. For him multiculturalism as ‘radical 
imaginary’ has to be separated from multiculturalism as ‘state policy.’ The latter leads to 
‘management, discipline and uniformity,’ the former to a creative and ‘spontaneous 
emergence’ of a vibrant, though not necessarily reconcilable, nation-state.  
 
The trouble with Canadian multiculturalism is that it continues to see diversity as a 
problem to be solved and Canadian history is replete with attempts at managing 
‘ethnocultural identities’ (5). Against this the Canadian state claims that diversity has 
been solved or is a non-issue because the Canadian state has been multicultural from its 
very inception with claims made that cultural diversity was part of Canada’s aboriginal 
peoples as well as, of course, the two dominant European settler communities: the French 
and the British. This claim is not uncommon as many other nations, including European 
nations, have said as much in defence of their own policies managing post-war ethnic 
diversity. Stuart Hall’s essay had made this clear with reference to Britain. Day does not 
buy this self-aggrandising reading of multiculturalism but pursues critically how 
recognition may be granted or attained. Drawing upon Hegel, Lacan, Taylor, Kymlicka, 
Bhabha, Žižek and Derrida, Day argues that ‘multiculturaist theory and practice must 
traverse the fantasy of fullness associated with the modern nation-state’ (12). He 
continues, ‘Only by abandoning the dream of unity, Canada may, after all, lead the way 
towards a future that will be shared by many other nation-states; it may, in its failure to 
achieve a universal mass identity, or even a universal mass of identities, inadvertently 
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come closer to its goal of mutual and equal recognition amongst all who have chanced to 
find themselves within its borders’ (12). 
 
The project should not imply that questions of race, sex and gender should remain private 
concerns and justice is dispensed with. Towards the end of his book Day returns to the 
question whether multiculturalism (‘as political theory and philosophy’) points towards 
‘an ethical community of equal and mutual recognition – a Sittlichkeit’ (177). The 
difficulties posed by in some sense this utopian ideal cannot be disentangled from the 
history of the nation itself. In the case of Canada the ongoing will to control and manage, 
to dissociate language from culture (Trudeau’s well-known references to two official 
languages of Canada but no official culture) continues to present diversity as a problem in 
need of fixing rather than diversity as an energizing principle that redefines the nation. 
The multicultural after all begins with the presumption that a homogeneous group (or 
groups who have created a sense of this homogeneity as in the Franco-British 
compromise in Canada) must find ways of controlling a growing diversity. It does not 
begin with diverse ethnocultural groups finding ways in which they may respond to the 
presumed homogeneous group. Day does not articulate it in quite this fashion but his 
references to the counter epistemology of the hybrid and his general unease about the 
primacy given to the Hegelian model of recognition suggests some such unease.  
 
Working through Kymlicka’s theory of a non-procedural liberalism which would allow 
for a theory of minority rights to exist alongside traditional human rights and individual 
freedom and Taylor’s well-known thesis about recognition granted to cultures of value 
and historical depth, Day concludes with notes towards a multicultural ‘radical 
imaginary.’ First, multiculturalism as theory and philosophy should go outside the fold, 
outside the domain of a state-sponsored ‘rational-bureaucratic action’ to solve the 
problem of diversity (2000, 222). The state must cease to see itself as the neutral ground 
in which dialogue between diverse ethnic groups can take place. It should also 
deconstruct its own locale in a colonialist, in this case, Canadian, history. The point that 
Day makes, and forcefully too, is that the state has its own ideological roots, its own bias, 
its own stake in ensuring that its version of culture and society remains the norm. 
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Although the liberal argument is that the personal is not the business of the state, the fact 
remains that the state has always been based on some values of some ‘persons.’ Day 
formulates this as a question: ‘If the current forms of social and political organization are 
‘not necessarily’ connected to any particular culture or ethnicity, then why is there such 
resistance to putting them at risk?’ (223). 
 
Day refers to the ‘fantasmatic structure of Canadian multiculturalism’ because it is 
predicated on the prior condition of a Canadian culture and this culture can be readily 
recovered or accessed. The fullness and harmony associated with these reveries is no 
more than a myth not because this harmony is glaringly spurious but because this 
harmony represses those exclusionary principles necessary to hold the myth together. 
Day’s history of Canadian diversity acknowledges the repressed, the dark side of 
Canadian history. To do so Canadian multiculturalism must, as he puts it, ‘(i) openly 
admit and orient to the impossibility of full identity; (ii) affirm the value of difference and 
the Other as such; and (iii) recognize the necessity of a negotiation of all universal 
horizons, including that of the nation(s)-state’ (224). The state must therefore 
acknowledge that there is no correct ‘person-type’ to which the polity should aspire since 
the type has never existed. The state must acknowledge difference and not strategically 
incorporate difference into its own system of quasi-assimilation. What the Other does is 
that it ‘demands’ that the Self modifies its own structures, to acknowledge that both the 
Self and the Other are situated ‘in an impossible quest for identity amidst the endless play 
of difference’ (225). It follows that no identity can be prioritized over another and if it has 
been we must confront the reason: colonial institutions that replicate only its own 
hegemonic form of subjecthood. For Day then, the role of the Canadian state should be to 
provide a space for a degree of free play, without necessarily endorsing any particular 
ideology. In this space of free play anything could be on the ascendant but the 
ascendancy may be only momentary as it would be subject to revision. What is preferred 
is not a ‘static, solidified order, but a dynamic and fluid chaos’ (225). To dissolve the 
problem of Canadian diversity, says Day, the project of multiculturalism as advancing 
Canadian unity must end. The Québécois nationalist position and the Canadian First 
Nation position on this are absolutely identical: both recognize that they are seen by 
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English Canada as ‘competitive aberrations to be eliminated, absorbed, or merely 
recognized’ (227). And isn’t this the agenda of (Canadian) multiculturalism? Concludes 
Day: 
 
In affirming difference as such, recognizing the impossibility of identity, and accepting the necessity 
of an ongoing negotiation of all universal horizons, Canada could start to move from 
multiculturalism as deep diversity – as ‘more well-managed difference’ within an authoritarian and 
hierarchical capitalist state form – to multiculturalism as radical imaginary, as différance, de-
terriorialization, more-than-life. (227) 
 
Conclusion: The Universal and the Particular 
In general terms the issues raised above congeals around the question of subjectivity, 
especially in the wake of the structuralist declaration of the ‘death of the subject.’ The 
ramifications of this declaration (which governed the field of literary and cultural theory 
for some time in the 70s and 80s) were felt across disciplines and led to an insistence on 
multiple identities against the idea of a singular, transcendental one. I want to use Ernesto 
Laclau’s brilliant essay ‘Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity’ (2003) 
to make a case for a realist understanding of the ‘pastness’ of multiculturalism. The essay 
does not see diversity as a problem; rather it makes a case, with which I am in agreement, 
that the post-Marxist principles of universalism (class, gender, and so on) have to be 
internalized within the particular not because of any hegemonic stipulation but because 
the principles of universalism were themselves ‘particular’ (linked to a specific western 
historical formation) and this particularity (now rendered as a universal) is a particularity 
that may be located within all particularisms. If the place/terrain from which the universal 
subject spoke is non-existent, then a space is created for the evolution of multiple 
identities, and new forms of multicultural subjectivities. The divide now is not between a 
subject position and the absolute signified of transcendentalism, but between the 
particularism of the multicultural Other versus the implied universalism of the Self. Or, 
presented as a question, can particularism now dictate an economy of differences in terms 
of other ‘particularisms?’ In the latter, identity simply becomes particular outside of the 
universal.  
 
The relative merits of the particular and the universal have been traditionally located 
within two propositions: first there is an absolute divide between the two, in that one 
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cannot be both, and second the universal must have priority over the particular because 
the universal alone can be rationally defended. The universal is therefore a principle that 
inheres post-Enlightenment modes of thinking, the particular is its aberrant and even 
recalcitrant other. But this universal, in post-Enlightenment Europe, was nothing more 
than a European particularism which presented itself as the universal. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the history of imperialism, which may be seen as the 
‘universalization’ of a European ‘particularism’ (Laclau 2003, 362). Here of course 
particularism was hoisted on to colonized peoples, peoples without history, who were in 
need of the civilizing mission of Europe. Laclau’s narrative moves to its inevitable 
conclusion: ‘the universal is no more than a particular that at some moment has become 
dominant and there is no way of reaching a reconciled society’ (363). 
 
But the ‘proliferation of particularisims’ as we have seen in recent times (and which 
certainly shadows multicultural thinking) does not offer an easy solution to current 
problems about difference. At its most awkward, defence of particularisms (which may 
inform the principle of absolute tolerance) produces the following logic:  
 
I can defend the right of sexual, racial and national minorities in the name of particularism; but if 
particularism is the only valid principle, I have to also accept the rights to self-determination of all 
kinds of reactionary groups involved in antisocial practices. Even more: as the demands of various 
groups will necessarily clash with each other, we have to appeal – short of postulating some kind of 
pre-established harmony – to some more general principles in order to regulate such clashes. In 
actual fact, there is no particularism which does not make appeal to such principles in the 
construction of its own identity. (Laclau 2003, 363) 
 
Pure particularism thus produces the ideal of harmonious co-existence within a coherent 
whole. But this ideal overlooks power relations within the groups that make up the 
coherent whole. It also overlooks the principle of separate developments along the lines 
of apartheid because each and every particular is its own self-contained universe. 
Realistically though the identity of an ethnic minority, for instance, can be fully achieved 
only if it is recognized as such by the nation-state. Laclau uses the word ‘integration’ 
instead of ‘recognition’ because he wishes to make it clear that along with the realization 
of an ethnic identity there is also an implicit demand that the achieved identity will share 
equally in the universal principles of social justice and fair play available to all citizens 
within the nation. This leads Laclau to put forward a further definition of the universal 
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and the particular: ‘the universal is the symbol of a missing fullness and the particular 
exists only in the contradictory movement of asserting at the same time a differential 
identity and canceling it through its subsumption in the non-differential medium’ (364). 
 
For Laclau, then, self-enclosed identities that make no reference to what is outside are 
neither ‘viable’ nor ‘progressive.’ It makes no sense for minorities in Europe for instance 
to refuse to participate in European institutions because to maintain pure identities plays 
to the logic of apartheid and forever creates the binary of the oppressor and the 
oppressed. ‘A particularism really committed to change,’ must therefore reject ‘both what 
denies its own identity and that identity itself’ (365). So identity requires constant 
negotiation so as to critique the dominant group (which denies minority identity) as well 
as self-reflect on its own demands for particularism. The shaping and re-shaping of 
identities within a dialectical and not oppositional politics is at the heart of multicultural 
thinking too. For Laclau there are a number of divergent courses that multiculturalism 
can follow. One is to ‘affirm, purely and simply, the right of the various cultural and 
ethnic groups to assert their differences and their separate development’ (366). This is, in 
other words, no more than the opposition of one particularism with another and is 
ultimately segregationist. The proper proactive solution is for particularism/difference to 
be asserted within a ‘global community’ in an a priori principle that is dictated by co-
existence. Laclau asks a question that holds the key to multicultural thinking: ‘Now, how 
could that coexistence be possible without some shared universal values, without a sense 
of belonging to a community larger than each of the particular groups in question?’ (366).  
 
The role of negotiation remarked above is, however, fraught with difficulties since the 
outcomes of negotiation are ultimately a matter of a balance of power within competing 
communities and are never something undertaken on a level playing field. There may be 
alliances based on mutual give and take but neither a sense of ‘collective will’ nor of 
community can arise out of such a fundamentally undertheorized notion of negotiation. 
What needs to be undertaken is based on a proper understanding of universalism itself. 
For, ‘it is one thing to say that universalistic values of the West are the preserve of its 
traditional dominant groups; it is very different to assert that the historical link between 
 
Portal Vol. 2, No. 2 July 2005    42 
 Mishra   What was Multiculturalism? 
the two is a contingent and unacceptable fact which can be modified through political and 
social struggles’ (366). This was indeed the argument of Mary Wollstonecraft who said 
that it made no sense to have universalistic human rights that ignored women as a group 
and simply advanced the rights of one section of the community. The historicizing of 
universalism would show that it was an ideology that began with the presumption that a 
nation was homogeneous, that Europe was the centre of the world and that it was self-
evidently rational. The world as it is cannot be understood in terms of this understanding 
of universalism. The unresolved tension between universalism and particularism now 
brings us closer to a different, a lot more energetic democracy that would take us away 
from Western Eurocentrism through an operation that could be called ‘a systematic 
decentring of the West’ (Laclau 2003, 367). ‘Eurocentrism [itself],’ writes Laclau, ‘was 
the result of a discourse which did not differentiate between the universal values that the 
West was advocating and the concrete social agents that were incarnating them’ (367). 
Laclau then proceeds to separate these ‘two aspects.’ If minority struggles show that 
actual practice restricts the ‘universalism of our political ideals to limited sectors of the 
population’ (here the majority population), then its spheres of application must be 
widened even as its ‘universal dimension’ is retained. The ‘concrete contents’ of this new 
universality can then be defended more fully: ‘Through this process, universalism as a 
horizon is expanded at the same time as its necessary attachment to a particular content is 
broken.’ To reject universalism outright on the grounds that it belongs to a single group 
doesn’t do anyone any good. If we can see the universal not in terms of a definable 
content but as a ‘receding horizon’ that is flexible enough to accommodate demands other 
than those enshrined in its putative content, then we can enter creatively into the heart of 
the paradox: which is that universality is incommensurable with particularity but ‘cannot 
exist apart from the particular’ (367). The paradox cannot be resolved, nor should it be 
resolved for the tension between the two, their non-resolution, creates the vibrant social 
conditions within which a democracy can thrive. The solution, if there were one, would 
imply that the true content of the universal has been found once and for all and there is no 
need for a ‘radical imaginary.’ This would then be contrary to democracy as a social 
politics in which there must always be a struggle between competing groups for a certain 
particularity to become universal. In a very real sense multicultural theory makes us 
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recognize a process of competition as well as the impossibility of arriving at a society 
secure in its universality. Laclau’s brilliant essay spells out a dichotomy in (multi)culture 
that need not be resolved but an understanding of which is crucial to a healthy democratic 
polity. For, after all, multicultural theory can only exist within the confines of such a 
democracy. 
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